Class and Statutory News

CCC 5 - 10 to 14 september 2018 major outcomes of the 5th session of the IMO Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)

09.18.18

THE IMO sub-committee on carriage of cargoes and containers held its 5th meeting (CCC 5)  from 10 to 14 September 2018, at the IMO headquarter in London.

As usual for a CCC meeting, a huge part of the debate focused on matters related to IMSBC and IMDG codes have taken .

Aside of this, important progress has been achieved on sensitive  issues as the safety of ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol as fuel (approval of guidelines) or the agreement for the use of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic services.

Various Unified interpretations, mainly related to IGC and IGF Code, were approved, as some proposal for amendments, in the view of their approval by Maritime Safety Committee.

Convention : IACS UI, IGC Code , SOLAS CH II-2 Fire

Flag : ALL FLAGS

Ship type : ALL TYPES

                                                                            CCC 5 - 10 to 14 september 2018
major outcomes of the 5th session of the IMO Sub-Committee on Carriage of Cargoes and Containers (CCC)

                                                                    SUMMARY

CCC 5 agreed, in principle, for submission to MSC 100 as an urgent matter with a view to approval, to : 

  •  Draft interim guidelines for the safety of ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol as fuel (item 3) ; 
  •  Draft Interim guidelines on the application of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic services (item 4) ; 
  •  Draft Interim Guidance for conducting the refined MHB (CR) corrosivity test (item 5).

CCC 5 approved the following draft amendments, with a view for approval and subsequent adoption by MSC : 

  • Paragraph 6.7.1.1 of part A-1 of the IGF Code - pressure relief systems to be fitted to fuel storage hold spaces, interbarrier spaces and tank connection spaces (item 3) ;
  • New regulation 11.8 for fuel preparation room fire-extinguishing systems (item 3) ;
  •  Paragraph 6.5.3.5.1 of the IGC Code and 16.3.3.5.1 of the IGF Code concerning tensile tests for materials other than aluminium alloys, in connection with the application of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic services (item 4)

CCC 5 approved the following unified interpretation on IGF Code, with a view for approval and subsequent adoption by MSC (item 8) :

  • Functional requirements applied to gas admission valves at dual fuel engines and gas engines (Sections 12.4 and 12.5, Part A-1 of the IGF Code) (
  • Ship steel protection against liquefied gas fuel (paragraph 6.3.10)
  • Hazardous area classification of fuel storage hold spaces (section 12.5.2.1 and footnote 23)
  • Alarms for loss of ventilation capacity (section 15.10.1)

CCC 5 approved the following unified interpretation on IGC Code, with a view for approval and subsequent adoption by MSC (item 8):

  • Cargo tank structure heating arrangement power supply (paragraph 4.19.1.6) ;
  • Fire Test for Emergency Shutdown Valves (paragraph 5.13.1.1.4) ;
  • Survival crafts protection (paragraph 11.3.1) ;
  • Tank groups in cargo area (paragraph 11.3.3) ;
  • Carriage of chapter 19 products, amended IGC Code (MSC.370(93)), on ships built after 1 July 1986 and before 1 July 2016.
Item 2 - Decisions of other IMO bodies

CCC 5 has noted that MSC 99 had approved MSC.1/Circ.1500/Rev.1 on Guidance on drafting of amendments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention and related mandatory instruments and MSC.1/Circ.1587 on Procedural aspects related to the drafting of amendments to safety related IMO conventions, other than the 1974 SOLAS Convention, and related mandatory instruments.

This guidance should not apply, in its entirety, to the IMDG and IMSBC Codes, as they are updated continuously. Chapter 17 of the IBC Code and chapter 19 of the IGC Code should neither be subject to the Guidance.

Item 3 - amendments to the IGF code and development of guidelines for low-flashpoint fuels

CCC 4 had re-established the Correspondence Group (CG) to continue the work on the draft amendments to the IGF Code regarding fuel cells and the development of the draft technical provisions for the safety of ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol as fuel. 

CCC 5 had for its consideration the report on the work of this CG.

Safety provisions for fuel cells 

CCC 5 agreed to develop the safety provisions for fuel cells as interim guidelines, instead of developing a new part E of the IGF Code for fuel cells, as formerly envisaged.

The Working Group (WG) on Amendments to the IGF Code and Development of Guidelines for Low-flashpoint Fuels, established by CCC 5, due to time constraints, could not consider the interim guidelines on safety of ships equipped with fuel cells. 

CCC 5 agreed to task the coming CG to further develop this text intersessionally.

Draft technical provisions for ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol as fuel

The draft technical provisions for the safety of ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol have been under development at IMO since 2013.

CCC 5 agreed, in principle, to the draft interim guidelines for the safety of ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol as fuel.

Instead of incorporating the technical provisions for the safety of ships using methyl/ethyl alcohol into the IGF Code, using them as interim guidelines has several positive consequences, such as rapid global implementation, time for assessment during the interim period, and the possibility for improvement before the provisions are incorporated into the IGF Code.

These interim guidelines provide provisions for the arrangement, installation, control and monitoring of machinery, equipment and systems using methyl/ethyl alcohol as fuel.

They apply to ships to which part G of SOLAS chapter II-1 applies. Chemical tankers using methyl/ethyl alcohol cargo as fuel should not be excluded in general. Special consideration should be given to the specific characteristics of those ships, and an appropriate provision in this respect has been added in the draft text.

The scope of the guidelines is limited to methyl/ethyl alcohol fuels with some additives and impurities, owing to the point that requiring 100% pure alcohol was not possible bearing in mind the current practice.

General risk assessment is required for the use of methyl/ethyl alcohol fuels.

The installation of fuel tanks in machinery spaces of category A must be discouraged. There should be surrounding cofferdams. Independent fuel tanks should be located in fuel storage hold spaces.

The interim guidelines only contain the gas safe concept and not the emergency shutdown (ESD) concept.

Here is the plan of these interim guidelines which can be sent upon request : 
    1 Introduction
    2 General
    3 Goal and functional provisions
    4 General provisions
    5 Ship design and arrangement
    6 Fuel containment system
    7 Material and general pipe design
    8 Bunkering
    9 Fuel supply to consumers
    10 Power generation including propulsion and other energy converters
    11 Fire safety
    12 Explosion prevention and area classification
    13 Ventilation
    14 Electrical installations
    15 Control, monitoring and safety systems
    16 Drills and emergency exercises
    17 Operation

In addition, the Plenary has invited MSC 100, as an urgent matter, to endorse safety topics identified by the WG and to refer them to other technical sub-committees for consideration and advise to CCC 6.

Draft amendments to paragraph 6.7 and chapter 11 of part A-1 of the IGF Code

CCC 5 approved the draft amendments to paragraph 6.7.1.1 and chapter 11 of part A-1 of the IGF Code.

Paragraph 6.7.1.1 of part A-1 of the IGF Code
 

The original intention of this paragraph was to require for pressure relief systems to be fitted to fuel storage hold spaces, interbarrier spaces and tank connection spaces, since these are the spaces that may contain LNG leakage.

IACS notes that the term "tank cofferdams" is only used in paragraph 6.7.1.1 of the IGF Code. It is not used in paragraph 8.1 of the IGC Code upon which the paragraph in the IGF Code is based.

The cofferdams required by paragraph 11.3.3 of the IGF Code for fire protection purposes are not expected to be subject to leaks from fuel containment systems, as, when LNG fuel pipes are routed through such spaces, they are to be protected by a secondary enclosure, as required by paragraph 9.5.1 of the IGF Code.

Hence, regulation 6.7.1.1 is amended as follow:
                        6.7.1.All fuel storage tanks shall be provided with a pressure relief system appropriate to the design of the fuel containment system and the fuel being carried. Fuel storage hold spaces, interbarrier spaces and tank  connection spaces and tank cofferdams, which may be subject to pressures beyond their design capabilities, shall also be provided with a suitable pressure relief system. Pressure control systems specified in 6.9 shall be independent of the pressure relief systems.

New paragraph 11.8. of the IGC Code

Paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code states:
                              "Any space containing equipment for the fuel preparation such as pumps, compressors, heat exchangers, vaporizers and pressure vessels shall be regarded as a machinery space of category A for fire protection purposes."

IACS questions whether the term "fire protection" in paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code only refers to structural fire protection. IACS understands that fuel preparation rooms should have both structural fire protection and fire extinguishing systems in accordance with the provisions of SOLAS chapter ll-2 for machinery spaces of category A.

The IGC Code includes in paragraph 11.5.1 requirement for fire extinguishing systems for spaces containing cargo handling equipment such as compressors and pumps.

However, this requirement does not appear to have been included in the IGF Code. IACS proposes to add a similar requirement to chapter 11 of the IGF Code.

New regulation 11.8 is added after existing regulation 11.7 as follows, and should apply to all ships, including existing one :
                               "11.8 Regulation for fuel preparation room fire-extinguishing systems-  Fuel preparation rooms containing pumps, compressors or other potential ignition sources shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of SOLAS II-2/10.4.1.1 and taking into account the necessary concentrations/application rate required for extinguishing gas fires."

Safety recommendations for the application of fuel oil with a flashpoint of not less than 55°C on board

Paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code states:
                           "Any space containing equipment for the fuel preparation such as pumps, compressors, heat exchangers, vaporizers and pressure vessels shall be regarded as a machinery space of category A for fire protection purposes."

IACS questions whether the term "fire protection" in paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code only refers to structural fire protection. IACS understands that fuel preparation rooms should have both structural fire protection and fire extinguishing systems in accordance with the provisions of SOLAS chapter ll-2 for machinery spaces of category A.

The IGC Code includes in paragraph 11.5.1 requirement for fire extinguishing systems for spaces containing cargo handling equipment such as compressors and pumps.

However, this requirement does not appear to have been included in the IGF Code. IACS proposes to add a similar requirement to chapter 11 of the IGF Code.

New regulation 11.8 is added after existing regulation 11.7 as follows, and should apply to all ships, including existing one :
                            "11.8 Regulation for fuel preparation room fire-extinguishing systems-  Fuel preparation rooms containing pumps, compressors or other potential ignition sources shall be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system complying with the provisions of SOLAS II-2/10.4.1.1 and taking into account the necessary concentrations/application rate required for extinguishing gas fires."

Safety recommendations for the application of fuel oil with a flashpoint of not less than 55°C on board

The United States and Canada proposed that the flashpoint of fuel oil should be reduced from 60°C to 52°C in the context of SOLAS chapter II-2. MSC 95 further agreed that the technical requirements for fuel oil with a flashpoint of less than 60°C would be provided in the context of the IGF Code. At CCC 4, Germany proposed that risk assessment methods such as FSA be used for further research.

CCC 5 had for its consideration comments from China regarding risk control requirements for the application of fuel oil with a flashpoint of not less than 55°C, based on the discussion on the application of fuel oil with a flashpoint below 60°C under the framework of the IGF Code.

CCC 5 agreed that the correspondence group could be tasked to consider these documents intersessionally.

Draft amendments of paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF code

CCC 5 addressed IACS UI GF13 regarding fire protection of spaces containing equipment for fuel preparation, as outlined in paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code. This UI states that fuel preparation rooms should have both structural fire protection and fire-extinguishing systems. 

Paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code requires that any space containing equipment for fuel preparation, such as pumps, compressors, heat exchangers, vaporizers and pressure vessels, shall be regarded as a machinery space of category A for fire protection purposes. However, it is not clear whether the reference to "fire protection purposes" means only structural fire protection or also includes means of escape and active fire protection measures.

Taking into account the Unified interpretations of the IGF Code (MSC.1/Circ.1558), a space containing equipment such as vaporizers, or heat exchangers which provide potential sources of release but not sources of ignition, is not regarded as a fuel preparation room and, consequently, is not to be provided with a fixed fire-extinguishing system. This is on the basis that such equipment is considered to provide only potential sources of release, not sources of ignition.

Instead of developing a UI, CCC 5 agreed to proceed with this matter as a draft amendment to the IGF Code

The WG established by CCC 5 was unable to develop a commonly agreeable text of the draft amendments to paragraph 11.3.1 of the IGF Code. Hence, CCC 5 agreed that the correspondence group could be tasked to develop the text intersessionally.

Item 4 - Suitability of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service and development of any necessary amendments to the igc code and igf code

MSC 96 had agreed to include a new output on "Suitability of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service and development of any necessary amendments to the IGC Code and IGF Code".

CCC 4 instructed a CG to finalize the test acceptance criteria for high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service, assess the suitability of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service in the context of its applicability to steel plates, with a view to developing generic guidance on the procedure for considering and approving new metallic materials for cryogenic service.

Following the position reached throughout the CG, CCC 5 agreed that high manganese austenitic steel would be considered suitable for cryogenic service.
 

Draft Interim guidelines on the application of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic services

CCC 5 approved the draft MSC circular on Interim guidelines on the application of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service for submission to MSC 100 as an urgent matter with a view to approval.

Application of the Interim guidelines to LNG cargo and fuel tanks

While the application of the Interim guidelines was initially limited to steel plates for the construction of LNG fuel tanks under the provisions of the IGF Code, the scope had been expanded to include also LNG cargo tanks, subject to the IGC Code.

References to ISO, IACS and other industry standards

It must be recalled that ISO 21635:2018 (Ships and marine technology – Specification of high manganese austenitic steel used for LNG tanks on board ships) was published in July 2018.

References to this have been included in the draft Interim guidelines where appropriate.

Here is the plan of the draft interim guidelines on the application of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service : 

               Part I General
                              1 Scope
                              2 Application
                              3 Definitions
               Part II Material specifications and testing requirements
                             4 Material specification
                             5 Chemical composition
                             6 Mechanical properties
                             7 Welding of metallic materials and non-destructive testing
                             8 Material testing and acceptance criteria
                             9 Manufacturer approval scheme
               Part III Application
                            10 Design application
                            11 References

The draft guidelines can be sent upon request.

Related amendments to the IGC and IGF Codes

CCC 5 approved the draft amendments to 6.5.3.5.1 of the IGC Code and 16.3.3.5.1 of the IGF Code concerning tensile tests for materials other than aluminium alloys with a view for approval and subsequent adoption by MSC.
                        6.5.3.5 Each test shall satisfy the following requirements:
                       .1 tensile tests: cross-weld tensile strength shall not be less than the specified minimum tensile strength for the appropriate parent materials. For materials such as aluminium alloys, reference shall be made to 4.18.1.3 with regard to the requirements for weld metal strength of under-matched welds (where the weld metal has a lower tensile strength than the parent metal). In every case, the position of fracture shall be recorded for information;

                          16.3.3.5 Each test shall satisfy the following requirements:
                          .1 tensile tests: cross-weld tensile strength is not to be less than the specified minimum tensile strength for the appropriate parent materials. For materials such as aluminium alloys, reference shall be made to 6.4.12.1.1.3 with regard to the regulations for weld metal strength of under-matched welds (where the weld metal has a lower tensile strength than the parent metal). In every case, the position of fracture shall be recorded for information;

It should be noted that CCC 5 was not able to consider the drafting of an outline and relevant checklists for generic guidance on the procedure for considering and approving alternative metallic material. These topics have been included in the terms of reference of the CG suitability of high manganese austenitic steel for cryogenic service as established by the Sub-Committee. 
 

Item 5 - Amendments to the IMSBC code and supplements

Proposals for amendment 05-19 of the IMSBC Code

The Editorial and Technical Group (E&T), at its twenty-ninth session, commenced the preparation of draft amendment 05-19 to the IMSBC Code, including a draft consolidated IMSBC Code.

CCC 5 authorized E&T 30 to finalize draft amendment 05-19 to the IMSBC Code, with a view to submitting the draft consolidated edition of the IMSBC Code, incorporating draft amendment 05-19, to MSC 101 for consideration and adoption.

Amendment to the definition of "Group A" cargoes

CCC 5 agreed that the definition of "Group A" should be amended to include phenomena other than liquefaction;and instructed E&T 30 to further consider this issue.

Proposal for amendment to section 9 and paragraph 9.2.3.7.3 of the IMSBC Code

CCC 5 considered submissions from Australia, Brazil, Canada, United States, NACE International and IIMA relating to the assessment of the Materials Hazardous only in Bulk category "Corrosive Solids", for which section 9.2.3.7.3 of the IMSBC Code states that the UN C.1 test1 is an acceptable test.2 The UN C.1 test, however, was developed for liquids and solids that may become liquid during transportation and had never been validated for solids.

CCC 5 agreed, in principle, to the following draft amendments with a view for their possible inclusion in amendment 06-21.
"A material shall be classified as MHB when the corrosion rate on either a steel or aluminium surfaces is between 4 mm and 6.25 mm a year at a test temperature of 55°C when tested on both materials. For the purposes of testing steel, type S235JR+CR (1.0037 resp. St 37-2), S275J2G3+CR (1.0144 resp. St 44-3), ISO 3574:1999, Unified Numbering Systems (UNS) G10200 or SAE 1020, and for testing aluminium, non-clad, types 7075-T6 or AZ5GU T6 shall be used. An acceptable test is prescribed in the United Nations Manual of Tests and Criteria, part III, section 37. When the test is performed the sample shall contain at least 10% moisture by mass. If the representative sample of the cargo to be shipped does not contain more than 10% moisture by mass, water shall be added to the sample. A representative sample of the cargo shall be tested at typical as shipped cargo conditions including moisture content by mass, bulk density, particle size distribution and atmospheric conditions. The assessment of localised corrosion occurring upon the steel surface shall be performed using national or international standards.
 

Guidance for Conducting the Refined MHB Corrosivity Test

In a complementary manner, CCC 5 approved it in general and agreed to the draft MSC circular on Interim Guidance for conducting the refined MHB (CR) corrosivity test for submission to MSC 100 for approval as an urgent matter.

Proposals for new individual schedules

Following individual schedules have been referred to E&T 30 by CCC 5 : 

  • Reaction Mass of Calcium Fluoride and Calcium Sulphate and Calcium Carbonate
  •  Flue Dust
  • Matte containing copper and lead 
  • Iron Silicate Granulated
  • Brucite
  • Crushed Shell
  • Chlorite
Item 6 - Amendments to the IMDG code and supplements

MSC 99 had adopted amendment 39-18 by resolution MSC.442(99), which is envisaged to enter into force on 1 January 2020 and on a voluntary basis from 1 January 2019.

MSC 99 also approved MSC.1/Circ.1588 on Revised Emergency Response Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous Goods (EmS Guide).

MSC 99 instructed CCC to review the footnotes in the IMDG Code when preparing the next consolidated version (amendment 40-20). Therefore, CCC 5 has instructed E&T 31 to carry out a comprehensive review on the footnotes in the IMDG Code when preparing amendment 40-20, with a view the outcome being considered by CCC 6.


CCC 5 agreed to instruct E&T 31 to further consider the issue regarding the approval of FRP tanks as IMO type 4 tanks.

Clarification of paragraph 7.1.4.4.2 of the IMDG Code

IACS raised the need to clarify the terms "life-saving appliances" and "areas with public access", as used in paragraph 7.1.4.4.2 of the IMDG Code.

IACS was of the view that both terms "areas with public access" were undefined, vague and therefore open to differing interpretations. Furthermore, if the term "life-saving appliances" includes lifebuoys, "remotely located" liferafts, lifejackets and immersion suits, as well as personal flotation devices and self-inflating slides, then this provision in the IMDG Code could have a significant restriction on where goods of class 1 can be loaded onto a ship.

While there was no support for the proposed draft UI, CCC 5 recognized that the term "life-saving appliances" in paragraph 7.1.4.4.2 of the Code needed further clarification, and, therefore, instructed E&T 31 to further consider this issue.

The interpretation of the term "areas with public access" met support from the Plenary. 

Hence, CCC 5 decided to proceed with this matter as draft amendments to the IMDG Code, and instructed E&T 31 to prepare draft amendments to the IMDG Code.

Item 7 - Amendments to the Code of Safe Practice for Cargo Stowage and Securing (CSS Code) with regard to weather-dependent lashing

The present version of annex 13 provides acceleration data applicable for ocean voyages throughout the whole year. Furthermore, it permits the reduction of these acceleration figures in the case of an operation in a restricted area, taking into account the season and the duration of the voyage. However, the method for reducing these figures has been left open to interpretation.

The acceleration tables in annex 13 are based on an accepted mathematical model for obtaining acceleration components resulting from ship motions. The same model is used in the IGC Code for the design of cargo tank supports.

The Code of Safe Practice for Ships Carrying Timber Deck Cargoes (TDC Code) and the Code of Practice for Packing of Cargo Transport Units (CTU Code) apply a reduction curve for ships accelerations with respect to expected significant wave-height for the voyage.

Sweden proposed to MSC 98 a new output to amend the CSS Code in order to include conditions for weather-dependent cargo securing, with a target completion date of 2019.

Important progress was made by CCC 5 with regard to draft amendments to annex 13 to the CSS Code but there is still work to be done before finalization. This topic has been referred to a dedicated CG. 

Recalling the background of basic acceleration values in annex 13 of the CSS Code and the calculation methods used for determining the reduction factor contained in the 2011 TDC Code (chapter 6, paragraphs 6.2.3 and 6.2.4), as well as the method used in respect of significant wave height in sea areas, as contained in the CTU Code (chapter 5, paragraph 5.5), no agreement was reached concerning the reduction curve for basic accelerations due to significant wave height. 

Draft amendments to the following parts of annex 13 to the CSS Code were prepared:
       .1 table 5 (Friction coefficient) in section 7.2 was modified; 
       .2 under table 2 (Basic acceleration data) in the section for "Remarks", a footnote was introduced to replace the existing sub-paragraph .3, i.e.                             "duration of the voyage is 25 days".

The drafting of amendments to CSS Code will be pursued through a CG. 

 

Item 8 - Unified interpretation of provisions of IMO safety, security and environment-related conventions


Unified interpretations of the IGF code

CCC 5 approved the following unified interpretation on IGF Code, and will submit them to MSC 101 for approval :

Functional requirements applied to gas admission valves at dual fuel engines and gas engines (Sections 12.4 and 12.5, Part A-1 of the IGF Code)

                        “Section 12.4 should be interpreted as the guiding methodology for the categorization of gas admission valves at dual fuel engines and gas engines. If no additional safety measures and no corresponding risk assessment in accordance with section 12.4 are available, the examples in section 12.5 should apply.”

                          The risk assessment in accordance with the relevant standards on area classification as set out in section 12.4 of part A-1 of the IGF Code is to be understood as a procedure equivalently applicable to the examples for hazardous area zones as laid out in section 12.5 of part A-1 of the Code.”

Ship steel protection against liquefied gas fuel (paragraph 6.3.10) – IACS UI GF2

The first sentence of paragraph 6.3.10 (Part A-1) of the IGF Code requires that the ship steel shall be protected from potential leakages by use of "drip trays" if liquefied gas fuel storage tanks are located on an "open deck". A need for clarification was identified to define whether or not drip trays specified in paragraph 6.3.10 of the IGF Code are required for tank connections in cases where liquefied gas fuel storage tanks are arranged in a similar manner to cargo tanks on gas carriers.
                       “Whether a drip tray should be needed or need not be required in accordance with the following:
                                             .1 when the tank is located on the open deck, drip trays should be provided to protect the deck from leakages from tank connections and other sources of leakage;
                                              2 when the tank is located below the open deck but the tank connections are on the open deck, drip trays should be provided to protect the deck from leakages from tank connections and other sources of leakage; and
                                             .3 when the tank and the tank connections are located below the deck, all tank connections should be located in a tank connection space. Drip trays in this case need not be required.”

Hazardous area classification of fuel storage hold spaces (section 12.5.2.1 and footnote 23) – IACS UI GF14

Paragraph 12.5.2.1 of the IGF Code specifically identifies fuel storage hold spaces as zone 1 hazardous areas. Footnote 23 states that fuel storage hold spaces for type C tanks are normally not considered as zone 1, which implies that they are normally considered zone 2 or non-hazardous. IACS considers that there is a need to have a global and common understanding of the approach to be adopted, particularly since type C tanks are the predominant form of LNG containment used on gas fueled ships.
                                        “1 For the purposes of hazardous area classification, fuel storage hold spaces containing type C tanks with all potential leakage sources in a tank connection space and having no access to any hazardous area, should be considered non-hazardous.
                                           2 Where the fuel storage hold spaces include potential leak sources, e.g. tank connections, they should be considered hazardous area zone 1.
                                           3 Where the fuel storage hold spaces include bolted access to the tank connection space, they should be considered hazardous area zone 2.”

Alarms for loss of ventilation capacity (section 15.10.1) – IACS UI GF15

                                          “Acceptable means to confirm that the ventilation system has the "required ventilating capacity" in operation should be, but not limited to:
                                          .1 monitoring of the ventilation electric motor or fan operation combined with underpressure indication; or
                                          .2 monitoring of the ventilation electric motor or fan operation combined with ventilation flow indication; or
                                           .3 monitoring of ventilation flow rate to indicate that the required air flow rate is established.”

Unified interpretations of the IGC code

CCC 5 approved the following unified interpretation on IGC Code, and will submit them to MSC 101 for approval :

Paragraph 4.19.1.6 of the IGC Code specifies the following requirements on heating the structural material for the cargo containment systems:
                                "4.19.1.6 The means of heating referred to in 4.19.1.5 shall comply with the following requirements:
                                  .1 the heating system shall be arranged so that, in the event of failure in any part of the system, standby heating can be maintained equal to not less than 100% of the theoretical heat requirement;
                                  .2 the heating system shall be considered as an essential auxiliary. All electrical components of at least one of the systems provided in accordance with 4.19.1.5.1 shall be supplied from the emergency source of electrical power;

IACS has considered the following two scenarios regarding the implementation of paragraph 4.19.1.6 of the IGC Code:
                                  .1 a blackout of the ship's main electrical system. As the standby electrical supply for the heating medium circulation and control units, etc. are powered from the emergency switchboard, it is envisaged that residual steam available for the glycol heat exchangers will maintain the cofferdam heating via the coils until the main generators are back in service; and
                                  .2 failure of the single boiler. The mains powered electric heat exchanger will supply the heat input to the glycol circulating pump, which will provide the cofferdam heating via the same coils.

IACS UI GC23 on paragraph 4.19.1.6 of the IGC Code is written as follows : 
                                  “1 Heating system referred to in 4.19.1.6.1 is to be such that in case of a single failure of a mechanical or electrical component in any part of the system, heating can be maintained at not less than 100% of the theoretical heat requirement.
                                  2 Where the above requirements are met by duplication of the system components, i.e., heaters, glycol circulation pumps, electrical control panel, auxiliary boilers etc., all electrical components of at least one of the systems should be supplied from the emergency source of electrical power.
                                  3 Where duplication of the primary source of heat, e.g. oil-fired boiler is not feasible, alternative proposals can be accepted such as an electric heater capable of providing 100% of the theoretical heat requirement provided and supplied by an individual circuit arranged separately on the emergency switchboard. Other solutions may be considered towards satisfying the requirements of 4.19.1.6.1 provided a suitable risk assessment is conducted to the satisfaction of the Administration. The requirement in paragraph 2 of this interpretation should continue to apply to all other electrical components in the system.”

Fire Test for Emergency Shutdown Valves (paragraph 5.13.1.1.4) – IACS UI GC24

Paragraph 5.13.1.1.4 of the IGC Code specifies requirements regarding fire tests for
emergency shutdown valves with materials having melting temperatures lower than 925°C, as
follows:
                  "5.13.1.1 Valves
                    Each type of valve intended to be used at a working temperature below -55°C shall be subject to the following type tests: (…).4 for emergency shutdown valves, with materials having melting temperatures lower than 925°C, the type testing shall include a fire test to a standard acceptable to the Administration."

IACS is aware of valves that are constructed of materials having melting temperatures lower than 925°C; but these materials are used only in parts, which, if they fail, do not cause intrinsic deterioration of the shell or seat tightness.

                     “Emergency shutdown valves, with materials having melting temperatures lower than 925°C should not include an emergency shutdown valve in which components made of materials having melting temperatures lower than 925°C do not contribute to the shell or seat tightness of the valve.”

Survival crafts protection (paragraph 11.3.1) – IACS UI GC22

Paragraphs 11.3.1.7 of IGC Code states the following : 
                      "11.3.1 On ships carrying flammable and/or toxic products, a water-spray system, for cooling, fire prevention and crew protection shall be installed to cover:
                        .7 exposed lifeboats, liferafts and muster stations facing the cargo area, regardless of distance to cargo area; and";

IACS UI GC22 on deck water spray systems has been developed to facilitate the global and consistent implementation of the requirements in paragraphs 11.3.1, 11.3.3 and 11.3.4 of the IGC Code, in particular regarding the understanding of what constitutes "two complete athwartship tank groupings"; the interconnections between the spray and fire systems; the capacity of the fire pumps serving water spray systems; and the protection of exposed survival craft with water spray.
                    “1 With reference to sub-paragraph .7 of IGC Code 11.3.1, the survival crafts on board including remote survival crafts (ref. SOLAS III/Reg. 31.1.4) facing the cargo area should be protected by a water-spray system taking into consideration cargo area extension for fire-fighting purposes as stated in 11.1.4.
                       2 Remote liferafts located in areas covered by water-spray protection as required in sub-paragraph .6 may be considered as adequately protected.”

Tank groups in cargo area (paragraph 11.3.3) – IACS UI GC22

Paragraphs 11.3.3.1 and 11.3.4 of the IGC Code state the following  : 
                       "11.3.3 The capacity of the water-spray pumps shall be capable of simultaneous protection of the greater of the following:
                           .1 any two complete athwartship tank groupings, including any gas process units within these areas; (…);

According to IACS UI GC22 : 
                     “1 Expression "two complete athwartship tank groupings" in sub-paragraph .1 of IGC Code 11.3.3 means any two groups of tanks where one group is defined as tanks located in transverse direction from ship side to ship side. Where there is only one cargo tank occupying a hold space from ship side to ship side, it should be considered as a "grouping" for the purpose of this interpretation.
                         2 "Any two complete athwartship tank groupings" should represent an area equal to the combined area of the two largest tank groupings including any gas process units within these areas.”

Carriage of chapter 19 products, amended IGC Code (MSC.370(93)), on ships built after 1 July 1986 and before 1 July 2016

An addendum to the International Certificate of Fitness for the Carriage of Liquefied Gases in Bulk has been approved for ships built before 1 July 2016. Member States are invited to use the annexed example when applying the relevant provision of the amended IGC Code.
                               “Ships constructed on or after 1 July 1986 and before 1 July 2016, wanting to carry products listed in chapter 19 of the amended IGC Code, may carry these products subject to them being listed in the addendum to the certificate of fitness and meeting the requirements of the amended IGC Code.”

Proposed draft unified interpretations to the IGC Code

Capacity of the emergency fire pump

Paragraph 11.3.4 (Water spray systems) of the IGC Code, as amended by resolution MSC.370(93), states the following:
                       "11.3.4 The boundaries of superstructures and deckhouses normally manned, and lifeboats, liferafts and muster areas facing the cargo area, shall also be capable of being served by one of the fire pumps or the emergency fire pump, if a fire in one compartment could disable both fire pumps."

Paragraph C) of IACS UI GC 22 is draft as follows
                      “11.3.4 highlights requirements for availability of fire pumps for water supply to the spray system for personnel and survival craft and muster station protection. The supply of fire water shall be redundant.
                        In view of the above in cases when the emergency fire pump is used to meet this requirement, its capacity, in addition to being capable of maintaining two jets of water as required by FSS Code Chap.12.2.2.1.1, shall be                          increased taking into account the spray application rates stated in 11.3.2.1, but limiting coverage to boundaries of normally manned superstructures and deckhouses, survival crafts and their muster areas.

                          For the purpose of this interpretation:
                                         - The expression "one of the fire pumps or emergency fire pump" is related to fire pumps located outside the space where spray pump(s) are located.
                                         - The expression "fire in one compartment", means a compartment where fire pump(s) serving the water-spray system in accordance with 11.3.3 are located.
                                         - The expression "both fire pumps" means the fire pumps required in accordance with SOLAS II-2/ Reg. 10.2.2.2.”

IACS sought clarification on the implementation of paragraph 11.3.4 of the IGC Code with regard to the capacity of emergency fire pumps, in particular whether sizing the pump for the most demanding area and dealing with one single incident at a time is acceptable

CCC 5 agreed to the general principle of dealing with one single incident at a time, and invited IACS to take the above comments and agreed principle into account and, if deemed appropriate, develop a draft UI for submission to a future session.

CCC 5 noted the concerns regarding the reference to "fire in one compartment" and that there may be cases where a fire in one compartment, other than those containing fire pumps, would disable the operation of the pumps, for example, if two fire pumps shared a switchboard in another compartment and said switchboard was burned due to a fire in one compartment, both fire pumps would become unusable. CCC 5 invited IACS to take the above comments into account and, if deemed appropriate, refine the draft UI for paragraph 11.3.4

Insulation of cargo piping systems

Paragraph 5.12.3.1 of the IGC Code specifies requirements regarding the insulation of cargo piping systems both to minimize heat leak and to protect personnel, as follows:
                           "5.12.3.1 Cargo piping systems shall be provided with a thermal insulation system as required to minimize heat leak into the cargo during transfer operations and to protect personnel from direct contact with cold                                      surfaces."

IACS UI GC25 on paragraph 5.12.3.1 of the IGC Code, addresses the insulation of cargo piping systems both to minimize heat leak and to protect personnel.

UI identifies parts of the piping system that should be excluded from the scope of application of the IGC Code requirement.

Plenary expressed concerns that the proposed draft UIs could allow elements of the system, such as bellows, to be uninsulated and unprotected from contact in an area where personnel were likely to contact them under normal conditions. CCC 5 noted that design features, such as physical screening measures, should be used to prevent personnel directly contacting the exposed cold surfaces.

CCC 5 has invited IACS to take the above comments into account and, if deemed appropriate, refine the draft UI for paragraph 5.12.3.1 for submission to a future session


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